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Abstract
Recently it has been shown, that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment
schemes are in general impossible. I however argue if we allow that an honest Alice can
fail with some small probability then secure protocols might exist. A scheme using quantum
envelopes is proposed where the Mayers-Chau-Lo strategy fails.
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1. Introduction
Quantum computers opened a new era in theoretical cryptography. If a working quan-
tum computer ever be built it will make obsolete most of the existing open cryptographic
methods because these mostly rely on the assumption that factoring large numbers and
computing the discrete logarithm are computationally extremely dicult tasks. Both can
be done in polynomial time with the help of a quantum computer [1]. (For an overview on
quantum computations see [2].)
But the laws of quantum mechanics oer novel ways for cryptography [3]. There are
two main lines of research: quantum key distribution and quantum bit commitment and
related topics. On the one hand, quantum key distribution [4] is proven to be uncondition-
ally secure against attacks by a third party. On the other hand, there is a serious doubt
about the existence of a secure quantum bit commitment protocol. Bit commitment would
be an important building block of more complicated cryptographic protocols and several
methods have been proposed, one of them the BCJL protocol [5] was believed to be secure
for a long time.
Surprisingly Mayers [6] and independently Chau and Lo [7][8] showed that this is not
correct. They proved the insecurity of a large class of protocols against an EPR-type
attack and it was later extended by Lo [9] to other two party protocols.
Although the class of protocols these authors examined is wide, it is not completely
exhaustive. Mayers, Chau and Lo showed that a bit commitment scheme where both Alice
and Bob may only cheat with negligible small probability and an honest Alice may always
succeed in proving her decision, is impossible. We cannot loosen the rst two requirements,
so if we want a secure protocol we must drop the third one.
2. Quantum Envelopes
The original question on this topic was the following: Can we put two or more classical
bits into one qbit, using its continuous degree of freedom? Of course we can only extract
one bit at the end, but we might decide later which one to obtain. This could be useful
for example at cable television broadcasting, where the broadcaster sends much more
information than what is actually used. (The receiver watches only one TV channel.)
It can easily be seen if we want 100% reliability then such a method is impossible
because we need more than two orthogonal states. But if we allow some error we may use
the following QTV2 coding scheme,
a1 a2 j’i
0 0 c j0i − s j1i
0 1 c j0i+ s j1i
1 0 −s j0i+ c j1i
1 1 s j0i+ c j1i
where c = cos(=8), s = sin(=8). We can extract the rst bit by measuring in
the bases j0i, j1i, and the second in j0i − j1i, j0i + j1i. The probability of success is
p = cos2(=8)  0:85.
Unfortunately the channel capacity [2],
C = 1 + p log2(p) + (1− p) log2(1− p); (1)
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turns out to be C  0:4 < 0:5 so the method is incapable for such a data compression, but
it can be useful at other areas.
(QTV is also available for 3 bits (QTV3). In this case we use the 8 vertices of a cube
embedded into the Riemann sphere, the bases for extracting the desired bit are j0i, j1i or
j0i  j1i or j0i  i j1i. The probability of success is 1=2(1 +
p
1=3)  0:79, the channel
capacity C  0:256.)
Imagine, Alice just bought a new car and she wants to install some eective steal
protection system. Nowadays one of the most eective method is to continuously send the
position of the car to a center. If it is stolen, the center knows where to look for the car.
But there is one disadvantage of this system, the center can monitor where Alice goes. If
we have quantum computers then we can easily solve this problem.
In this situation Alice wants to send (or we may say deposit) some information to
Bob who should read this information only under certain circumstances (i.e. if the car was
stolen). To achieve this, Alice encodes the information using some error correcting method
that can correct up to 15% error rate, then chooses a random string of bits, encodes the
message and the random string using the QTV2 scheme and sends these qbits to Bob. Bob
stores it in a quantum memory and if necessary, he extracts the message and corrects the
errors. When Alice wants to check that Bob did not read her message she asks him to
send it back, and then as she knows exactly the state of the qbits she measures it using
the appropriate bases. (c j0i − s j1i, s j0i+ c j1i or c j0i+ s j1i, −s j0i+ c j1i). If Bob read
the message he cannot reconstruct the quantum state, and Alice will nd a 25% error rate
in her measurements.
This is of course not a bit commitment protocol, Bob can read the message at any
time without any additional information from Alice. But upon request he must send the
original qbits back. It is like a quantum key-distribution scheme, where Alice sends the
qbits to herself through a channel where Bob may try to gain some information without
being detected. Quantum key-distribution is believed to be a secure algorithm and in this
case Bob’s task is even more dicult because there are no classical messages between the
two parties because they are the same.
The classical analogue of bit commitment is that Alice puts her message into a safe.
In this case Alice would put the message into an envelope which can be opened, but cannot
be closed again. This is why I call this method quantum envelope1. Clearly, information
envelopping is impossible in the classical world. If Alice has sent some classical information
to Bob, there is no way to assure Alice: Bob forgot this information.
Finally I would like to mention an interesting fact about the information content of
the QTV2 coding scheme. If Alice encodes two random bits (i.e. all four possibilities have
equal probability), then the von Neumann entropy [2] of the qbit:
S = −Tr% log2 % = 1 (2)
indicating that it contains 1 bit of information on the two random bits. But we saw that
Bob can extract only 0.4 bit, then where is the other 0.6 bit hiding? It is there, but Bob
1 Some care must be taken if Alice envelopes a single bit because Bob may measure a
few bits of the message, without risking too much. Alice should choose n− 1 random bit
and the enveloped bit is determined by the parity of the n bits of the message.
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needs some help to obtain it. If Alice tells him the exclusive or of her two bits (which is
clearly only one bit of information) then Bob knows that the qbit can only be in one of
two orthogonal states, and he can easily learn the second bit. So the exclusive or is only
one bit but is worth 1.6 bit for Bob.
3. The bit commitment scheme proposal
The protocol is the following:
1. Alice chooses 2n random bits ai; bi (i = 1; ::; n), encodes them by the QTV2 scheme
and sends the resulting n qbits to Bob.
2. For every i Bob randomly measures either ai or bi. (Of course about 15% of his
measurements are wrong.)
3. Bob puts his decisions on which bit to measure and the result of the measurements
into a quantum envelope but he does not use any error correcting method, and sends
this 2n qbits to Alice.
4. Alice chooses one half of the pairs of qbits, and tells her choice to Bob.
5. Bob tells Alice which one of ai and bi he measured in these cases, what were the
results and what are the random bits he used to close the envelope.
6. Alice opens the selected half of the envelope. Her measurements must be in perfect
agreement with the data given by Bob and the deviation of Bob’s measurements from
the real ai; bi must be within the condence limits and about half of them must be a
measurement of ai. If this is not so then Bob probably wants to cheat and Alice must
abort the operation. If everything looks all right then Alice stores the other half of
the quantum envelope in a quantum memory. She must keep them until the reveal
step. The bits revealed by Bob are thrown away.
7. Alice sends Bob an error correction checksum on the ai-s, that can correct d errors
2.
The value of d will be specied later.
At the end of the initialization Alice has n=2 pairs of random bits ai; bi and n=2 pairs of
qbits, the remaining of the quantum envelope. Bob has n=2 bits which are the estimates
of ai or bi and the checksum.
8. After this initialization, Alice must choose the bit to be committed, e = 0 or 1.
9. Alice sends Bob ai XOR bi using the BB84 [10] coding scheme, i.e. she uses the bases
j0i ; j1i if e = 0 and the bases j0i+ j1i ; j0i − j1i if e = 1. Bob stores this n=2 qbit.
This concludes the commit part.
2 In the following it is assumed that this checksum cannot correct nor detect more than
d errors. Usually error correction codes are constructed by putting spheres of radius d
with respect to the Hamming distance into the vector eld of binary strings of length n.
Generally it cannot be done tightly (an exception is n = 7, d = 1) thus there will be
strings that do not belong to any sphere. If Bob receives such a string then he knows that
there were more than d errors. But if n and d are suitably chosen then it can be achieved
that the probability of detecting more than d0 errors is negligible small and d0 is not much
greater then d.
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10. During the reveal part, Alice sends back the quantum envelope and announces ai; bi
and e.
11. Bob veries that Alice did not open the envelope, the announced ai agrees with the
checksum, ai XOR bi agrees with the qbits and the deviation of his measurements
from the announced ai; bi are within the condence limits.
Why does it work? First let us show that the proof of Mayers, Chau and Lo is not
applicable here. If Bob is honest then Alice was given with one particle states after step 3.
One half of them refers to those bits which are just about to be thrown away, so this part
is unimportant. She cannot ddle with the other part either, because Bob knows the state
of these and any entanglement will be detected. Thus, when considering Alice’s cheating
opportunities we need not consider this part. Alice only sends 2(n=2) qbits and a checksum
to Bob. Following the Mayers-Chau-Lo strategy Alice instead of choosing random bits,
selects entangled pairs of qbits and computes the checksum and the qbits to be sent to Bob
with a quantum computer. If she changes her mind, she performs a unitary transformation
on the qbits that are left on her side that changes her bit. This can be done if during the
commit part she provides Bob with the same density matrix independent of e. But here
this is not the case. If Bob could delay his measurements until the end of the commit
phase then he could easily nd out e. He just assumes that Alice has e = 0 in mind, he
measures the BB84 encoded qbits and he gets ai XOR bi. After ai XOR bi are known,
the QTV2 encoded bits can be only in two orthogonal states and it can be measured using
the appropriate bases (which is rotated by =8 with respect to the honest bases). If the
checksum does not agree with ai then Alice’s bit is 1, if it agrees than it is 0 with very
high probability.
Now it is clear why do we need the complicated initialization. Alice must be sure that
Bob already measured the rst n qbits before she sends the second portion.
How can Bob cheat? If he was honest during the initialization, he is left with n=2
classical bits, half of them ai. Measuring the BB84 encoded qbits in the e = 0 bases he may
reconstruct the missing ai-s with the help of the bi-s with 15% error. If d > 0:15(n=2), then
Bob may determine, whether he has only 15% error in his data, (e=0), or (15/2+50/2)%
(e=1). (Bob may icrease the dierence between the expectation values by measuring more
bi. Measuring only bi-s he has 50% for e = 1.) If d < 0:15(n=2) this strategy does not
work.
For a dishonest Bob it is essential that he can delay his measurements until the end
of the reveal part. He may also try the Mayers-Chau-Lo strategy. Instead of the quantum
envelope he may send an entangled qbit. For example, he may get an ancilla qbit prepared
in the j0i state and apply the following transformation to the ancilla and the ith QTV2
qbit:
0B@
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1CA : (3)
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where x and y are unknown to Bob. After the transformation he sends the ancilla to Alice
and another qbit where he claims that he measured ai. (To get the precise QTV2 coding,
both qbits must be rotated by =8 but this only complicates our discussion.)
If Alice wants him to reveal this bit he simply measures the qbit in the ai basis and
announces the result. (The scrambling bit is the complementer of the result.) It can
be seen, that Alice cannot notice this cheat. If this bit is not selected, Bob may try to
measure it in the basis, determined by the BB84 qbit. But because of the entanglement, a
measurement only on the qbit at Bob cannot give the correct answer. Simple computation
shows that Bob can only determine ai with an error probability of c
2 so he gained nothing.
To eliminate this error, he would need the other qbit to perform the inverse transformation,
but this qbit is deposited at Alice, and Bob will not get it back before the reveal step.
A more general attack is when Bob takes 3 ancilla bits, the rs two in a singlet state,




1 1 1 −1
1 1 −1 1
1 −1 1 1
−1 1 1 1
1CA (5)
on the QTV2 qbit and the third ancilla. It is controlled by the 2
nd ancilla which trans-
formation to use. After this Bob sends the second and third ancilla to Alice, the second
contains information on Bob’s choice, the third on the result of his measurement, at least
Alice thinks so. Again, if Alice wants to open this envelope, Bob measures his two qbits
and this determines the state of Alice’s qbit. The above transformations guarantee the
85% agreement with the (ai; bi)-s. But, if this bit is not selected, then Bob is left with a





c2 0 0 0
0 s2 0 0
0 0 1=2 −cs
0 0 −cs 1=2
1CA : (6)
Its eigenvalues are 12c
2 and 12s
2, thus Bob cannot choose a basis where he could get a
certain result with probability more than c2 or less than s2. This attack does not work
either.
Can Alice cheat? Using the Mayers-Chau-Lo strategy not. Another possibility is that
she sends entangled pairs of qbits to Bob. When she has decided on e she follows the
same tactic as Bob would do without the envelope: she measures her half of the BB84
qbit pairs in the basis determined by e. Now she knows what Bob will measure. After
this she measures the QTV2 qbits using the dishonest basis determined by the previous
6
measurement. The set of ai; bi she got diers from Bob’s one by about 15%. But what
about the checksum? In this strategy Alice cannot generate it from the qbits so she had
had to tell Bob a random checksum. The ai-s she has are of course do not agree with this
checksum so she has to change some bits, but this increases the distance between her and
Bob’s ai; bi. The expectation value of the number of bits to be changed can be roughly
estimated from below by d=2 so at the end the average number of wrong bits is more than
(1 − p)n=2 + (2p − 1)d=2 (p = c2  0:85). For n=2 is suciently large the width of the
probability distributions can be small enough to allow Bob detecting this cheat.
It is not clear whether there are other possibilities. Here I would like just to outline
why this scheme is not ruled out by the MCL proof. In the \General form of the Bit-
Commitment Scheme" outlined in ref. [7] Bob must have the same density matrix after
the commit part, otherwise he could cheat. Here this is not the case so we have to force
Bob to measure in the initialization part. But this gives rise to uncertainties so even an
honest Alice can fail to prove her committed bit. Particularly this scheme contradicts to
Question/Answer 2 on page 7 of ref. [7]. Here Bob may not delay his measurement of
step 2. If he sends some entangled qbits instead of the quantum envelope then the method
becomes a \General Bit-Commitment Scheme" and he allows Alice to involve these qbits
in the unitary transformation of changing her mind3. The key element of the protocol are
these qbits and the method which prevents both party from touching them.
Conclusion
I showed above a bit commitment protocol which evades the MCL proof of the im-
possibility of unconditionally secure QBC. Their proof is not wrong but this protocol does
not t in their denition of the general QBC. Although I showed the security against two
obvious cheating strategy the protocol’s security is not proven so the question of the exis-
tence of a secure QBC is reopened but not solved. This method is a bit complicated and
requires quantum memory even for the honest participants so it is not realizable with the
present technology. However a secure QBC would be a very useful cryptographic primitive
thus it is worth examining every possibility.
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Note Added in Proof
During the completion of this work Adrian Kent published a series of papers on this
topic [11][12]. His work is more exhaustive and he can prove the security of his protocol.
3 The method may be improved if Bob sends independent one particle states as quantum
envelopes only for half of the bits and sends entangled states in the other half. Alice still
cannot involve these qbits in the unitary transformation because she cannot distinguish
them from the rst half and when Bob gets them back he may check that Alice really sent
the density matrix corresponding to her announced bit.
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Although our methods are dierent both of them concentrate on the same loopholes in the
proof of Mayers Chau and Lo.
In Kent’s protocol the NA qbits sent back by Bob play a similar role as a quantum
envelope. However in my protocol Alice’s security is protected by the envelope which she
keeps until the reveal step, in Kent’s method the envelope is immediately sent back and
Bob’s honesty is ensured by his declarations of the n-s. This dierence must be examined
in the future.
Appendix: Probability distributions
In the text I usually used only the expectation values but in reality we must work








what determines the upper bound for d. Now examine Alice’s cheating strategy. If she has


















For large n it becomes a very sharp distribution and one can use the estimate d instead of
d=2 as was in the text.
To determine the error distribution in the case of a cheating Alice we must convolute
(7) and (8), keeping in mind that some initial errors may be repaired when Alice changes












(m+ k − z)=2

n=2− k
(m+ z − k)=2

pn=2−m(1−p)m (9)
and the sum is restricted to the values, where m+ k − z is even.
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